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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondent,

: Case No. 920185

v.

:

CHARLES MONTGOMERY,

: Category No. 14

Petitioner.

t
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari
to the Utah Court of Appeals.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a)
(1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this case are:
1.

Did the court of appeals properly affirm

petitioner's conviction and decline to review the merits of
petitioner's claim on appeal, i.e., that the trial court
submitted to the jury an inadequate instruction on reasonable
doubt, when petitioner's trial counsel assisted the trial court
in drafting the instruction?

An objection to a jury instruction

is not properly preserved for review without a statement for the
ground of the objection.
(Utah 1987).

State v. Medina. 738 P.2d 1021, 1023

However, the appellate court may review an issue

improperly preserved for appeal in order to avoid "manifest
injustice."

Ibid.

"But if a party through counsel has made a

conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial
court into error, [an appellate court] will then decline to save
that party from the error."

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158

(Utah 1989), cert, denied, Bullock v. Utah, 110 S. Ct. 3270
(1990).
2.

Did submission of the reasonable doubt instruction

give rise to reversible error sufficient under the plain error
rule?

Under the plain error rule a defendant must show that the

error was both obvious and prejudicial such that there is a
reasonable likelihood of a different result.
P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989).

State v. Verde, 770

Because this issue presents a

question of law, the trial court's ruling is not entitled to any
particular deference, and the ruling should be reviewed for
correctness.

State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and
rules are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner, Charles Montgomery, was charged by
information with attempted murder, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 and S 76-4-101 (1990)
(R. 1). Following a jury trial in the Eighth Judicial District
Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Dennis L. Draney, presiding, petitioner was convicted of
attempted manslaughter, a third degree felony, under Utah Code
2

Ann. SS 76-5-205 and 76-4-101 (1990), and was sentenced to a term
of not more than five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 173-74).
Petitioner filed motions for a new trial and arrest of judgment,
claiming, in part, that the trial court erred in failing to
submit an adequate reasonable doubt jury instruction (R. 166-72).
The trial court denied the motions (R. 182, Appendix B).
On appeal, petitioner addressed only his claim
concerning the inadequacy of the reasonable doubt jury
instruction, arguing that, notwithstanding his failure to raise
the issue below, the conviction should be reversed pursuant to
the plain error doctrine (Petitioner's Brief on appeal at 4-12).
In response, the State argued that petitioner had
helped draft the instruction, thus inviting the instructional
error, and that the court should therefore decline to review
petitioner's claim on the merits (Respondent's Brief on appeal at
3-7, Appendix C ) .
Following an expedited hearing pursuant to rule 31,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals affirmed
petitioner's conviction (Order of Affirmance, March 31, 1992,
Appendix D ) .
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On the evening of November 29, 1989, after completing
their work, petitioner and his stepson, David Bailey, were being
driven home by their employer, Eddy McKelvey (Transcript of
trial, hereinafter MT.,M at 60-62, 96-97).

During the previous

four days the three men, and another, had been working on a

3

drilling rig near Parachute, Colorado (T. 60-61, 97). Bailey
testified that petitioner had been giving him a hard time while
on the job, and petitioner acknowledged that the two had
developed some work-related disagreements (T. 61, 163). On the
way back to Vernal all three men drank brandy and beer, and
Bailey and petitioner argued heatedly about Bailey's job
performance and attitude and about money Bailey owed to
petitioner (T. 62-63, 98-99).

At one point petitioner threatened

to "knock the shit out of [Bailey] and [his] mother [Marie,
petitioner's wife]," if Bailey did not leave their house
(T. 101). At some point either petitioner, or both he and
Bailey, asked McKelvey to stop the truck so that they could fight
it out, but McKelvey refused, whereupon the altercation subsided
(T. 63-64, 99-102, 164, 176-79).
Upon arriving in Vernal between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m.,
petitioner left Bailey off at their trailer, continuing on with
McKelvey to a local bar to meet petitioner's wife (T. 64, 98,
166, 181). Petitioner drank more at the bar and then returned to
the trailer with Marie, with whom he was then arguing (T. 65-66,
167, 181-82).
Shortly after entering the trailer, petitioner and
Bailey renewed their earlier dispute.

Bailey testified that upon

being awakened by petitioner's arguing with his mother, he
resolved to move out of the trailer, packed some of his
belongings and made three or four trips to his car (T. 65-66).
After his last trip, petitioner tried to begin fighting again by

4

attempting to grab him while pushing Marie, who was trying to
intercede, out of the way and that it was petitioner who threw
the first punch (T. 66-67, 79). Bailey quickly wrestled
petitioner to the floor, got on top of him and hit him on both
sides of his face repeatedly, stopping when he saw blood on
petitioner's face (T. 68).
Marie's rendition1 of these events substantially
corroborated Bailey's.

Officers Roth and Vanderbusses both

testified that Marie said that before the fight began petitioner
and Bailey exchanged heated remarks about Bailey's not having to
live there anymore and that petitioner "had it coming" (T. 107,
122-25).
Petitioner did not recall anyone saying anything before
the fight began (T. 183). He claimed that Bailey set upon him at
the instant he entered the trailer and that in the course of
their first grappling, he did not push Marie out of the way (T.
167, 182).
Bailey left the trailer after having "beat the hell"
out of petitioner, but returned about five minutes later out of
concern for his mother's well-being (T. 69-70, 107, 123). Bailey
claimed that as he approached the trailer he looked through the
1

Marie invoked the marital privilege and did not testify
(T. 104). However, Robert Roth, Uintah County deputy sheriff and
Robert Vanderbusses, Vernal city police officer, testified about
what Marie had told them a short time later when they interviewed
her in the emergency room at the Ashley Valley Medical Center in
Vernal (T. 105-06, 116-118). Their renditions of Marie's
testimony substantially agreed with Bailey's account (T. 107-08,
121-25).
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window and observed petitioner looking through all the kitchen
cupboards and shelves and then walking to the back room, while
overhearing petitioner yelling, "Where are my bullets?" (T. 70)
Bailey then entered the trailer and asked his mother to leave
with him (T. 71, 107, 123), The two were leaving the premises in
Bailey's car when Marie remembered that she had left her purse in
the trailer.

Bailey insisted on retrieving it for her, returned

to the trailer and opened the door (T. 72, 108, 123).
Bailey's and petitioner's accounts at trial of the
events that quickly followed again differed in small but
significant ways.

Bailey testified that when he opened the door

petitioner was standing in the living room about four (4) feet
away.

Bailey did not say anything as he opened the door (T.74).

Petitioner turned and looked at him for about two seconds, raised
his .22 calibre pistol and, without gesture or comment, pointed
the gun at Bailey's chest and fired (T. 73-74).

Bailey then

turned and ran for the car, and Marie took him to the hospital
(T. 74).
Petitioner testified that after Bailey had beaten him
and left with Marie, he was trying to collect himself and locate
the telephone book to call the police when "[Bailey] just jerked
that door back like that and stepped in like this" (T. 171). He
described Bailey as "crouched down," and then straightening up
with arms flung wide with one foot in and one foot outside of the
trailer door (T. 191). Within fifteen to thirty seconds
petitioner reached for the gun, which was in the top of his
6

opened traveling bag (T. 170-73, 188-89, 193). Bailey
immediately stopped moving (T. 191-92).
four feet from petitioner.2

Bailey was then about

Indicating, at trial, that he had

twice had his neck fused and was afraid for his life, petitioner
fired one shot towards the opening in the doorway not filled by
Bailey's body (T. 169-72, 189-92).

He claimed he only intended

to scare Bailey, though he recognized that shooting as he did was
dangerous and that it was likely to cause serious damage if he
hit someone (T. 172, 192-3).
Dr. Norman Nielson examined Bailey in the emergency
room at the Ashley Valley Medical Center.

He found that the

bullet from petitioner's gun had entered Bailey's chest two
inches to the left of the sternum, penetrated the left lung,
passed within one inch of his heart and came to rest on the
backside of the chest just underneath the skin.

The bullet wound

caused air and blood to leak into the chest cavity, resulting in
a life threatening condition.

It took two hours to stabilize

Bailey, after which he was helicoptered to the University of Utah
Medical Center (T. 149-50).
Dr. Nielson also examined petitioner, following his
arrest, and found that he had suffered extensive, though not

2

The estimation of distance is Bailey's (T. 73).
Petitioner's estimation of distance was made with respect to an
exhibit, not part of the record on appeal, and was not made
explicit (T. 171). However, he did testify that he was within a
foot of his traveling bag containing the gun, which lay on top of
the breakfast bar, when Bailey opened the trailer door (T. 18889). A photograph of the interior of the trailer, State's
exhibit 8, appears to support Bailey's estimate.
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life-threatening blows to his face.

He also noted that despite

prior surgeries to fuse three of his cervical vertebrae, one of
the discs had slipped, leaving petitioner with a potential for
paralysis or death in the event of further slippage.

A hard blow

to the face or being tackled could cause such slippage (T. 152155).

Petitioner claimed that he was scared all the time about

injuring his neck, but that it had not kept him from engaging in
heavy physical work in the five years following his injury in
1985 (T. 169, 196). Bailey claimed that he knew petitioner had
neck problems but did not know at the time of the incident that
he had a neck fusion (T. 87-89).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Petitioner claims that although he failed to object to
the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction, this Court may
nonetheless review the matter for "plain error."

Utah case law

plainly states that where a defendant has not only failed to
object to the instruction at trial, but also has led the trial
court into the alleged error by actively waiving any objection,
the appellate court will decline to review the matter.
The reasonable doubt jury instruction did not give rise
to reversible error under the plain error rule.

The instruction

was the substantial equivalent of that disapproved in State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), and found incorrect by a
majority in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), and
therefore, obviously incorrect.

However, the error in submitting

the instruction did not give rise to reversible error because
8

there was no reasonable likelihood of a different result if the
instruction had not been given.

There is no doubt that

petitioner had the requisite mens rea for manslaughter and that
he deliberately shot the victim.

Further, there is no doubt that

a reasonable man in petitioner's position could reasonably have
believed that it was necessary to fire the gun when the victim
had stopped moving upon being confronted with such a showing of
force.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONER, WHO HELPED DRAFT THE REASONABLE
DOUBT INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT,
INVITED ERROR, AND THUS SHOULD NOT BE
PERMITTED TO COMPLAIN OF ERROR ON APPEAL.
On appeal petitioner effectively acknowledged that he
had failed to raise in the trial court the claim that the
reasonable doubt jury instruction was defective (Petitioner's
Brief on appeal, 11 at Point IV).
In response, the State argued that not only had
petitioner failed to raise the jury instruction issue in the
trial court, but he had also helped draft the instruction.

Thus,

on the authority of this Court's ruling in State v. Medina, 738
P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987), the State argued that the court should
decline to review petitioner's claim on the merits.
Following an expedited hearing pursuant to rule 31,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court of appeals affirmed
petitioner's conviction (Order of Affirmance, Appendix D ) .
"As a general rule, a timely and specific objection
9

must be made in order to preserve an issue for appeal. Absent a
timely objection, [an appellate court] will review an alleged
error only if it is obvious and harmful, i.e., only if it
constitutes "plain error."

State v. Whittle, 780 P.2d 819, 820-

21 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted).

"But if a party through

counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from objection
or has led the trial court into error. Tan appellate court! will
then decline to save that party from the error."

State v.

Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added), cert,
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3270 (1990).
In Medina, this Court rejected a challenge to a jury
instruction on precisely the grounds argued by the State to the
court of appeals in this case. In Medina, the trial court
distributed to both counsel for the defendant and the State a
proposed Allen instruction for their consideration before
submitting it to the jury.

In response to the court's inquiry as

to the acceptability of the instruction the defendant's counsel
answered, "I have no objection.

I have read it."

Medina, 738

P.2d at 1022. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the
grounds that the jury instruction impermissibly interfered with
his right to a jury trial.

Recognizing that his failure to

object in the trial court precluded him, as a general rule, from
assigning error on appeal under rule 19(c), Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the defendant argued that the supreme court
could review the matter in order to avoid "manifest injustice."

10

Id- at 1023.3
In affirming the conviction this Court stated:
It is true that in reliance on this
provision [of rule 19(c)], we have considered
the propriety of instructions with respect to
which an objection has not been made below.
However, uniformly these have been situations
where counsel for the party complaining on
appeal merely remained silent. The instant
case presents a very different situation.
Here, defense counsel did not remain silent;
rather, she actively represented to the court
that she had read the instruction and had no
objection. Apparently, Medina's counsel
considered the issue and consciously decided
that it was in Medina's interest to have the
instruction given. Although in retrospect
this decision may appear to have been illadvised, the fact remains that counsel
consciously chose not to assert any objection
that might have been raised and affirmatively
led the trial court to believe that there was
nothing wrong with the instruction. Under
such circumstances, we decline to review the
instruction under the manifest error
exception to Rule 19(cl.
Ibid, (emphasis added)/
3

Rule 19, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, provides in
pertinent part:

(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.
4

Subsequent to its ruling in Medina, this Court held "that
in most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice [as it appears
in rule 19(c)]' is synonymous with the 'plain error' standard
expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and elaborated
upon in fState v. Eldredoe, 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989), cert.
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In this case petitioner has never candidly acknowledged
that, instead of merely failing to object to the trial court's
proposed reasonable doubt instruction, he actively collaborated
in writing them, evidenced by the following colloquy
instructions:
The Court: Then we have proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. It's a two-paragraph one.
It's the one that goes, "It's not one that is
nearly [sic] fanciful or imaginary." It's
the more expanded one that we have used.
Mr. Souvall [Petitioner's Counsel]: This is
the one that I objected to on the Ellifritz
trial because it has the word "substantial"
in it. A reasonable doubt is one that is
real and substantial. I think substantial is
way too strong of a word to describe a
reasonable doubt.
The Court: I don't. The more I have thought
about it the more I think that is probably
the best description we can give them. But I
understand your concern. What do you suggest
as an alternative?
Mr. Souvall: Delete the sentence. Just,
["I]t is a doubt based upon reason and one
which reasonable men and women would have
upon a consideration of the evidence.["]
Just delete that before the semicolon.
The Court: You would have to say, ["A]
doubt, reasonable doubt, and is a doubt based
upon . . .,"
Mr. Souvall: Yes.
Mr. Williams [State Prosecutor]: I will not
go over the ["]substantial,["] but I think I
would still want the ["]real["] language,
["A] reasonable doubt is one which is real
and is based upon reason.["]
denied, 493 U.S. 814]." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22
(Utah 1989). Thus, petitioner's claim of plain error is properly
addressed under the manifest injustice standard of rule 19(c).

12

The Court: ["]Reasonable doubt is one which
is real and is based upon . . . [.H] Okay,
Harry?
Mr. Souvall: That's fine.
that.

I won't object to

The Court: ["] A reasonable doubt is one
which is real and based upon reason and one
which is --[•"]
Mr* Souvall: What instruction number was
that?
The Court:

5.

(Transcript of Trial at 199-200) (emphasis added).
The colloquy makes clear that petitioner's
participation in preparing the instruction evidenced a conscious
effort to design an instruction that would not improperly expand
the degree of doubt allowable for a conviction.

Also, a brief

examination of jury instruction 5/ in conjunction with the above
colloquy, reveals that the trial court fully accommodated
petitioner's counsel's request over its own considerations about
the best instruction to give to the jury (Jury Instruction #5, R.
81, attached herein at Appendix E).
Considering a similar, deliberate failure to object in
the trial court, this Court in Bullock stated:
'[T]he plain error . . . test . . .
ultimately permit[s] the appellate court to
balance the need for procedural regularity
with the demands of fairness.'. • .
If the decision was conscious and did not
amount to ineffective assistance of counsel,
this Court should refuse to consider the
merits of the trial court's ruling. Indeed,
the failure to object in such instances
should be treated as a conscious waiver and

13

should preclude further consideration of the
issue.
Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158-59 (footnote omitted).

In explaining

the relationship between the plain error and invited error, the
Court said:
The plain error rule exists to permit
review of trial court rulings as way of
protecting a defendant from the harm that can
be caused from less-than-perfect counsel.
But the purpose of that rule is in no way
implicated if defense counsel consciously
elects to permit evidence to be admitted as
part of a defense strategy rather than
through inadvertence or neglect.
Ibid, (emphasis added).5
In State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, (Utah 1987), a death
penalty case, this Court found no prejudice resulting from
alleged prosecutorial misconduct because it found the defendant
invited the improper remarks.

Commenting on the impropriety of

invited error, this Court stated:
A defendant should not be permitted to
initiate an argument before a jury and make
use of it, then wait until after the
prosecutor has responded to it and complain
5

In both Bullock and Medina, the defendants also claimed on
appeal that each of their trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to object with respect to the alleged
substantive errors, i.e., inadmissible expert testimony and the
improper Allen charge, respectively. In this case no claim of
ineffective assistance had been made. However, even if an
ineffective assistance claim were made, it would have no impact
on the result, since, as argued below, there would have been no
reasonable likelihood of a different. See State v. Templin, 805
P.2d 182, 186-87 (noting that the second element of a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel is the showing that apart from
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 697, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2069 (1984), reh'g denied, 467
U.S. 1267, 104 S. Ct. 3562 (1984).
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it was improper on appeal. Otherwise, the
possibility of invited error will become the
general rule.
Id. at 561.

See also State v. Thompson. 110 Utah 113, 130-31,

170 P.2d 153, 161-62 (1946) (refusing to reverse where elements
instructions requested by defendant were comparable to similarly
erroneous instructions given by trial court); State v. Gleason.
17 Utah 2d 150, 151, 405 P.2d 793, 794-95 (1965) (finding
"eleventh hour" request for additional jury instructions "should
be canvassed in an atmosphere of invited error" because
procedurally unjustified where there was ample opportunity to
avoid the dilemma); State v. Perdue. 813 P.2d 1201, 1203-06 (Utah
App. 1991) (refusing to consider an allegedly deficient
reasonable doubt jury instruction, submitted by the defendant,
and opining "where invited error butts up against manifest
injustice, the invited error rule prevails").
There was no further discussion by petitioner in the
trial court concerning the sufficiency of the trial court's
reasonable doubt instruction.

Petitioner positively acceded to

the reasonable doubt instruction proposed by the trial court,
which was amended at his request to reflect a more favorable
reasonable doubt standard.

Thus, as in Medina, this Court should

decline to review a claim that an instruction was erroneously
given, when the error, if any, has been invited.

15

POINT II
IT WAS NOT PLAIN ERROR TO SUBMIT THE
REQUESTED REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION
BECAUSE IT HAS NEVER BEEN FOUND REVERSIBLE,
AND PETITIONER, IN ANY EVENT, WAS NOT
PREJUDICED UNDER THE FACTS OF THE CASE.
Petitioner claimed on appeal that the reasonable doubt
instruction he requested below was improper under State v.
Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989); State v. Pedersen,
802 P.2d 1328 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah
1991); and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S.
(1990).6

, 111 S. Ct. 328

While this Court's opinions in Ireland and Johnson

clearly offer support for defendant's argument, they just as
clearly do not offer support for his contentions under the plain
error doctrine.
"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks

6

The State does not deny that a reasonable doubt
instruction must adequately convey the State's burden of proof.
The issue here concerns the adequacy of language employed to
achieve that purpose. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding in Cage
is not apposite to this case since the challenged language there
was entirely different than that which appears in the challenged
instruction in this case.
Petitioner's reliance on Pedersen as a basis for the
retroactive application of appropriate reasonable doubt standards
is also misplaced. In Pedersen, the court upheld a reasonable
doubt instruction that had been purged of the language found
objectionable in Ireland (see Pedersen, 802 P.2d at 1331-32).
The instruction ruled on by the court of appeals, therefore, was
neither that which this Court had before it in Ireland, nor that
which the trial court submitted in this case. Thus, Pedersen
cannot stand as clear authority in support of the claim that an
instruction containing the language found objectionable in
Ireland gives rise to reversible error, and, therefore, Pedersen
is not relevant authority to be applied retroactively.
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to upset the judgment."

State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah

1985) (quoting State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)).
A.

This Court Should Decline to Review
Petitioner's Plain Error Claim for Failure to
Support Argument with Either Citation to the
Record or Legal Authority.
"A separate and independent basis for the affirmance of

the trial court is that the defendant failed to refer to any
portion of the record that factually supports his contentions on
appeal."

State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755, 757 (Utah 1982).

Additionally, an appellate court will decline to rule on argument
unsupported by any legal analysis or authority.

State v.

Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984).
Recognizing his failure to timely object to the
instruction in the trial court, petitioner argued to the court of
appeals (and to this Court on writ of certiorari) that it should
consider his claim under the plain error rule (Petitioner's Brief
on appeal at 2-4). However, petitioner's argument below has been
entirely devoted to showing that the challenged instruction was
improper.

Petitioner has cited authority for the purpose behind

the plain error, but has entirely failed to (1) identify the
requirements of the plain error rule, i.e., obviousness and
harmfulness, (2) support any argument with respect to the
requirements with facts from the record or (3) support his
argument with any legal analysis or citation to authority.

On

such facts this Court should decline to consider petitioner's
plain error claim.

In any event, petitioner's claim is

insufficient under the plain error rule.
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B*

Submitting the Instruction was not Plain
Error,
,f

[T]he plain error rule's purpose is to permit [the

appellate court] to avoid injustice."

State v. Eldredae, 773

P,2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814.

"The

first requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error
by 'plain,' i.e., from [the appellate court's] examination of the
record, [the appellate court] must be able to say that it should
have been obvious to a trial court that it was committing error.
The second and somewhat interrelated requirement for a finding of
plain error is that the error affect the substantial rights of
the accused, i.e., that the error be harmful."
(citations and footnote omitted).

Ld. at 35

In showing the instructional

error harmful, "the appellant must show a reasonable likelihood
that absent the error, the outcome below would have been more
favorable."

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 122 (Utah 1989).

See

also rule 30, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure ("Any error,
defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.")
1.

The Trial Court Submitted an
Obviously Incorrect Instruction.
In State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah 1989), the

defendant challenged a reasonable doubt instruction given by the
trial court.

Justice Stewart, dissenting, identified three

distinct problems in that instruction.

First, the instruction

effectively and erroneously equated an "abiding conviction of the
truth of the charge" with a lack of reasonable doubt, and thereby
18

failed to obviate all reasonable doubt.

Id. 773 P.2d at 1381.

Second, it improperly permitted the type of decision-making
process which governs one in "the more weighty affairs of life"
to be applied to the determination of guilt in a criminal
proceeding.

Jld. at 1381-82. Third, it inappropriately

instructed that a reasonable doubt might "not merely be a
possibility."

JCd. at 1382. Notwithstanding Justice Stewart's

criticisms, this Court upheld the instruction, noting that burden
of proof requirements were supplemented by two other
instructions, which (1) required the prosecution to establish
every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and (2)
identified the presumption of innocence and entitled the
defendant to an acquittal if there remained a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 1380. However, the majority accorded those criticisms
respect and directed trial courts to discontinue the use of the
"more weighty affairs of life language," and "possible or
imaginary" language which might be understood to diminish the
prosecution's standard of proof.

Ibid.

In State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989), this
Court upheld a conviction wherein reasonable doubt instructions,
also supported by other instructions which identified the
presumption of innocence and proof of the elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, again contained the "more weighty affairs of
life" language. JCd. 774 P.2d at 1146. Justice Stewart concurred
in the result, opining that while the instruction was not
correct, it "[did] not rise to the level of reversible error."
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Id. at 1147-48. Justice Stewart's concurrence would appear to be
based on the challenged instruction's omission of the "possible
or imaginary" language,

found disfavored in Ireland.

Justice

Zimmerman, with Justice Durham concurring, agreed with Justice
Stewart that the instruction was not correct, but concurred in
the result because, in light of the evidence, the error was
harmless. .Id. at 1149. Thus, following Johnson, a majority of
this Court considered the Ireland-type instruction incorrect.
The State recognizes that the instruction given in this
case is very similar to that submitted in Johnson.

It contains

the phrase, "more weighty and important matters relating to your
affairs," making it the substantial equivalent of the "more
weighty affairs of life" language disapproved of in Ireland and
by three justices in Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1147-48 (see Jury
Instruction 5, R. 81, Appendix A).

The instruction also stated:

"A reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful,
or imaginary, because almost everything related to human affairs
is open to some possible doubt."

Therefore, for the purposes of

plain error analysis, the State concedes that any court cognizant
of this Court's supervisory directive in Ireland, and the
concurrence of three justices in Johnson, would have been on
clear notice that the instruction given in this case was
disfavored.7
7

By the same reasoning, the instruction is also no more
deficient than those given in either Ireland or Johnson. As in
Ireland and Johnson, the trial court submitted other instructions
which (1) placed on the State the burden of proving of proving
every element of the crime of which petitioner was convicted
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Having conceded the obviousness of the error, as a
matter of law, the State would, however, contend that the error
was not blatantly obvious.

Only by having recognized that the

concurrence of Justice Zimmerman and Justice Durham in Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Johnson, a conviction otherwise
affirmed, would the trial court have understood that the
reasonable doubt instruction was no longer approved by a majority
of this Court.

In contrast is the type of notice conveyed in

this Court's opinion in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986).
There this Court specifically directed trial courts to give a
cautionary instruction where eyewitness identification was a
central issue in the case and such was requested by the defense,
while expressly noting that the Court was in the course of
abandoning the discretionary approach to such instructions and
reversing previously controlling authority.

.Id. at 492

(reversing State v. Malmrose, 649 P.2d 56 (Utah 1982)).

In fact,

no Utah conviction has ever been reversed on the ground that
instructions comparable to those in Ireland and Johnson were
given to the jury.

beyond a reasonable doubt and (2) identified the presumption of
innocence (Jury Instruction Nos. 2 and 10, at R. 79 and 88,
respectively).
Also, the statement, by its construction, puts "merely
possible" doubt in the category of "imaginary" and "fanciful"
speculation, expressly recognized by Justice Stewart as properly
distinguished from reasonable doubt, see Ireland, 773 P.2d at
1382 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Interpreting the sentence in
this manner also renders it the functional equivalent of that
quoted above from Johnson, wherein proof beyond a reasonable
doubt does not require the "excluding of all possibility of
error" to an absolute certainty. .Id. at 1148.
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2.

There was No Reasonable Likelihood
of a Different Outcome on the Facts.
M

[J]ury instructions are to be considered as a whole.

When taken as a whole if they fairly tender the case to the jury,
the fact that one or more of the instructions, standing alone,
are not as full or accurate as they might have been is not
reversible error."

State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah

1981); accord Holland v. United States, 75 S. Ct. 127, 137-38
(1954) (reasonable doubt instruction may be misleading alone, but
acceptable when read in combination with other jury
instructions).

A conviction will be overturned only if a

defendant can show that but for the erroneous instruction there
was "a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result."
Johnson, 774 P.2d at 1146 n.16 (citing Tillman 750 P.2d at 561),
1149 (Zimmerman, J., concurring); Verde, 770 P.2d at 122
(applying the Johnson harmless error standard to plain error
analysis).
Petitioner was convicted of attempted manslaughter
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. SS 76-4-101 and 76-5-205(1)(b) and (c)
(1990) (see /Jury Instruction #11, R. 88). Section 76-5-205(1)(c)
provides:
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes
manslaughter if the actor:
•

• • •

(c) causes the death of another under
circumstances where the actor reasonably
believes the circumstances provide legal
justification or excuse for his conduct
although the conduct is not legally
22

justifiable or excusable under the existing
circumstances.
Pursuant to section 76-4-101, the jury was instructed
that the elements of "attempt" are (1) "the same mental state of
mind required for the commission of the offense" and (2) "conduct
constituting a substantial step towards the commission of the
offense" (Jury Instruction #14, R. 93).
The mental state required to prove attempted
manslaughter under section 76-5-205(1)(c) is intent to cause
death or serious bodily injury.

See State v. Howell. 649 P.2d

91, 94 (Utah 1982) (holding that the mens rea for attempted
manslaughter under section 76-5-205(1)(c) is intentional
conduct); State v. Norman. 580 P.2d 237, 240 (Utah 1978) (finding
the requisite mental element to support a conviction of attempted
manslaughter is the intent to kill or cause serious bodily
injury).

See also 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr.,

Substantive Criminal Law §7.10 (1986) (noting that most killings
which constitute voluntary manslaughter are of the intent-to-kill
sort, but that theoretically they might also be of the intent-todo-serious-bodily-injury type).
The undisputed facts are that petitioner fired a gun at
the victim, the bullet passing within two inches of the victim's
heart (T. 149-50).

Petitioner claims that he only fired in

Bailey's direction, intending to scare him (T. 192), but the jury
evidently did not believe him, and the facts do not at all
support petitioner's explanation.

Petitioner was only about four

feet from Bailey when he shot him, a fact corroborated by the
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photograph and petitioner's admission of his position in the
trailer (T. 188-89; State's Ex. 8). Bailey testified that
petitioner deliberately took aim at his chest and fired (T. 7374).
Petitioner's denial is unbelievable on those facts and
on his patent lack of credibility generally.

He refused to

acknowledge that he encouraged or baited Bailey into an argument,
denying not only Bailey's testimony, but also that of McKelvey,
an uninterested witness whose overall testimony clearly indicated
that he intended petitioner no harm (T. 175-78).

Nonetheless,

petitioner claimed that McKelvey made up his testimony (T. 1789).

He claimed that upon his entering the trailer, Bailey

immediately attacked him without provocation, an allegation
denied not only by Bailey, but by his wife Marie, whose evenhandedness was shown by her refusal to testify against her
husband directly (T. 65-66, 107, 122, 167, 182-83).

He clearly

suggested that he was unable to use the phone book to call the
police because he was still trying to collect himself after being
severely beaten (T. 193-94).

However, petitioner would still

have had the jury believe that in that groggy state, in a matter
of seconds, he had the presence of mind to grab a gun, about
which he had not been thinking and which just happened to be
within arm's reach, and fire at a target just four feet away
which he intended to miss (T. 171-73, 189, 192) Most remarkably,
petitioner testified that in the past he had fired the .22
caliber pistol before without having first to cock it (T. 190).
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The testimony was an obvious effort to support his story that he
instantaneously reached for the gun when Bailey appeared and to
refute the inference that he had already located and loaded the
pistol before Bailey opened the trailer door.

However, Bailey

testified that minutes before he had witnessed petitioner
searching for the bullets to his gun (T. 70). More tellingly,
deputy Roth testified that the gun was a single action revolver
which required the hammer be physically pulled back before it
could be fired (T. 115). In light of these remarkable denials it
cannot be doubted that petitioner was lying about his intent to
merely scare Bailey.
Petitioner's defense was justification.

The jury was

instructed, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (1990), that
a person is justified in using force against
another person when he reasonably believes
the force is necessary to defend himself
against the other person's imminent use of
unlawful force: however, a person is
justified in using force which is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily
injury only if he reasonably believes that
the force is necessary to prevent death or
serious bodily injury to himself.
A person is not justified in using force
if he:
(a) initially provokes the use of force
against himself with the intent to use force
to inflict bodily harm, or
(b) if he was the aggressor or was
involved in a combat by agreement unless he
totally withdrew from the encounter and
effectively communicated to the other person
his intent to withdraw from the fight.
(Jury Instruction #16, R. 95) (emphasis added).

The jury was

further instructed that the "reasonableness" of petitioner's
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belief was to be determined by an objective standard, though
petitioner's actual beliefs could be a part of that determination
(Jury Instruction #17A, R. 97).
In State v. Clayton, 658 P.2d 624 (Utah 1983), this
Court found the defendant, convicted of attempted murder, had no
rational basis for self-defense where, immediately prior to his
being shot, the victim had nothing in his hand, made no sudden
moves toward the defendant and did not reach for anything in his
pocket.

See also In re Gonzales, 545 P.2d 187 (Utah 1975)

(finding no basis for self-defense where the defendant simply
shot his assailant immediately after being punched by him); State
v. Brown. 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980) (finding no credible evidence
of self-defense where the defendant could simply have closed the
door when he saw from inside the trailer his alleged assailant
pick up a club).
The State does not deny that a reasonable man with
petitioner's physical infirmities, beaten as petitioner had been,
could reasonably believe that deadly force was necessary to repel
a similar, imminent onslaught.

However, the facts provide no

reasonable support for such a defense in this case.
Bailey testified only that he opened the door and
petitioner almost immediately fired the gun directly at him (T.
73-74).

Petitioner claimed that Bailey jerked open the door,

that Bailey jumped in the door, possibly with his "arms out,
perhaps in a wrestling type of stance," with one foot inside and
one foot outside the trailer (T. 190-91).
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The cross-examination

then continues:
MR. WILLIAMS [Prosecutor]: Is that a fair
description, Mr. Montgomery?
PETITIONER:

Yes sir, sure is.

MR. WILLIAMS:
vou?
PETITIONER:

Was he moving towards

Best I recall, he stopped.

MR. WILLIAMS:
he stopped?
PETITIONER:

Okay.

Okay.

What did you think when

I didn't know.

(T. 191-92) (emphasis added).
Petitioner admitted that between fifteen and thirty
seconds passed before he drew the gun and fired at Bailey (T.
193).

Thus, under the most favorable interpretation of the facts

for petitioner, Bailey made no immediate advance upon him after
he opened the door and that he hesitated to enter the trailer.
The only reasonable inference is that Bailey stopped moving when
he perceived a gun being pointed directly at him, whether it was
grabbed hastily or deliberately.

However, under any

interpretation, Bailey had not actually entered the trailer and
was not advancing on petitioner when petitioner shot him.

Under

these facts, a reasonable man could only have believed that an
attack was no longer imminent, that he had exercised sufficient
force by merely pointing the gun at his alleged assailant to
repel an attack and that there was no longer a rational necessity
to fire the gun.
Additionally, there is no doubt that had the jury
considered petitioner's quarrels with Bailey earlier in the
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evening as evidence of petitioner's provoking the use of force
against himself, it would have been compelled to deny petitioner
his claim of self-defense.

On the testimony of Bailey, McKelvey

and Marie, there is no question that petitioner played an active
role in provoking Bailey's violently beating him.

Furthermore

Bailey testified that petitioner threw the first punch, and
although both he and petitioner denied that petitioner had hit
him in the trailer, deputy Hollebeke testified that Bailey had
some light contusions on the right side of his face (T. 139).
In sum, there is no reasonable likelihood, given the
facts of the case, that the outcome would have been different
even if a proper reasonable doubt instruction had been submitted
to the jury.

Because petitioner has failed to show that the

submission of the instruction was prejudicial error, this Court
should reject his claim of plain error and affirm his conviction.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court to affirm petitioner's conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this W

day of September, 1992.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

76*2-402. Force in defense of person — Forcible felony defined.
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when
and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to
defend himself or a third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force; however, a person is justified in using force which is intended or
likely to cause death or serious bodily iqjury only if he reasonably believes
that the force is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself
or a third person, or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony.
(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified
in Subsection (1) if he:
(a) initially provokes the use of force against himself with the intent to
use force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm upon the assailant; or
(b) is attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony; or
(c) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement, unless
he withdrawsfromthe encounter and effectively communicates to such
other person his intent to do so and the other notwithstanding continues
or threatens to continue the use of unlawful force.
(3) For purposes of this section, a forcible felony includes aggravated assault, mayhem, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, and
aggravated kidnapping, rape, forcible sodomy, and aggravated sexual assault,
as they are defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, and also includes arson, robbery,
and burglary, as defined in Title 76, Chapter 6. Any other felony offense
which involves the use of force or violence against a person so as to create a
substantial danger of death or serious bodily injury also constitutes a forcible
felony. Burglary of a vehicle, as defined in Section 76-6-204, does not constitute a forcible felony except when the vehicle is occupied at the time unlawful
entry is made or attempted.
Utah Code Ann. (1990)

76-4-101. Attempt — Elements of offense.
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a
crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step
toward commission of the offense.
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense.
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise:
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; or
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed
them to be.

76-5-205. Manslaughter.
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another; or
(b) causes the death of another under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse;
or
(c) causes the death of another under circumstances where the actor
reasonably believes the circumstances provide a legal justification or excuse for his conduct although the conduct is not legally justifiable or
excusable under the existing circumstances.
(2) Under Subsection (l)(b), emotional disturbance does not include a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305.
(3) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (1Kb),
or the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (l)(c), shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
R U L I N G

vs.
CHARLES KENNITH MONTGOMERY,
Case No. 901800004 FS
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion for a New Trial, and Motion for Arrested
Judgment are denied. The court rules that the jury instructions now
questioned by the Defendant accurately explained the law applicable
to the case and the responsibility of the jury. Additionally, the
Defendant has not shown by the record that he objected to the
questioned instructions at trial.

DATED this

fffh

day of May, 1991

BY THE COURT:
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.&

DENNIS L. DRANEY
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

cc: JoAnn B. Stringham
Robert M. McRae
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APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED
MANSLAUGHTER, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 AND
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Appellee,

: Case No. 910284-CA

v.

s

CHARLES MONTGOMERY,

: Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for attempted
manslaughter, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-205 and § 76-4-101 (1990), in the Eighth Judicial
District Court in and for Uintah County, State of Utah, the
Honorable Dennis L. Draney, presiding.

This Court has

jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1991).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue presented in this case is:
1.

Should this Court review the merits of defendant's

claim on appeal, that the trial court submitted to the jury an
inadequate instruction on reasonable doubt, an instruction to
which defendant positively acceded at trial?

An issue not raised

in the trial court is not properly preserved for review,
v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 n.l (Utah App. 1991).

state

However, the

appellate court may review an issue improperly preserved for

appeal if the trial court has committed "plain error."

Ibid.

"But if a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to
refrain from objecting or has led the trial court into error, [an
appellate court] will then decline to save that party from the
error."

State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 158 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and

rules are compiled in an Appendix where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Charles Montgomery, was charged by
information with attempted murder, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 and S 76-4-101 (1990)
(R. 1). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of attempted
manslaughter, a third degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
SS 76-5-205 and 76-4-101 (1990), and was sentenced to a term of
not more than five (5) years in the Utah State Prison (R. 17374).

Defendant filed motions for a new trial and arrest of

judgment, which were denied (R. 166-69, 182-83).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A recitation of the facts here involved is not
necessary to a resolution of the issues raised on appeal.
Rather, critical facts will be discussed in the body of this
brief as they become relevant to specific issues.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant claims that although he failed to object to
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the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction, this Court may
nonetheless review the matter for "plain error."

Utah case law

plainly states that where a defendant has not only failed to
object to the instruction at trial, but also has led the trial
court into the alleged error by actively waiving any objection,
the appellate court will decline to review the matter.
ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT ACCEDED TO THE REASONABLE DOUBT
INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE TRIAL COURT, AND
THUS CANNOT COMPLAIN ON APPEAL.
Defendant acknowledges through his rendition of the
record and citation to authority that he failed to object to the
reasonable doubt instruction given to the jury and thereby failed
to preserve his claim of error on appeal (Appellant's Brief at 46).

An issue not raised in the trial court is not properly

preserved for review.
(Utah App. 1991).

State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 554 n.l

Nonetheless, he argues that this Court should

consider the merits of his claim and find that the trial court
committed plain error in giving an instruction that allegedly
misstates the reasonable doubt standard.

The argument is utterly

without merit.
State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987), presents a
factual scenario almost identical to this case and is fully
dispositive of the issue defendant raises on appeal.

In Medina

the trial court distributed to both counsel for the defendant and
the State a proposed instruction for their consideration before
submitting it to the jury.

In response to the court's inquiry as
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to the acceptability of the instructionf the defendant's counsel
answered, "I have no objection.

I have read it."

Id. at 1022.

The defendant was convicted and appealed on the ground that the
jury instruction impermissibly interfered with his right to a
jury trial.

Recognizing that his failure to object in the trial

court precluded him, as a general rule, from assigning error on
appeal under rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
defendant argued that the supreme court could review the matter
in order to avoid "manifest injustice."

Id., at 1023.*

In affirming the conviction the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
It is true that in reliance on this
provision [of rule 19(c)], we have considered
the propriety of instructions with respect to
which an objection has not been made below.
However, uniformly these have been situations
where counsel for the party complaining on
appeal merely remained silent. The instant
case presents a very different situation.
Here, defense counsel did not remain silent:
rather, she actively represented to the court
that she had read the instruction and had no
objection. Apparently, Medina's counsel
considered the issue and consciously decided
that it was in Medina's interest to have the
1

Rule 19, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure, provides in
pertinent part:

(c) No party may assign as error any portion
of the charge or omission therefrom unless he
objects thereto before the jury is
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to
which he objects and the ground of his
objection. Notwithstanding a party's failure
to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest
injustice.

4

instruction given. Although in retrospect
this decision may appear to have been illadvised, the fact remains that counsel
consciously chose not to assert any objection
that might have been raised and affirmatively
led the trial court to believe that there was
nothing wrong with the instruction. Under
such circumstances, we decline to review the
instruction under the manifest error
exception to Rule 19fcK
Ibid, (emphasis added),2

See also State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d

155, 158 (Utah 1989) ("[I]£ a party through counsel has made a
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial
court into error, we will then decline to save that party from
the error."); State v. Morgan. 813 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah App.
1991) (Court declines to address the merits of the claim because
counsel's failure to object to certain testimony was reasonable
and presumably intended in light of his trial strategy).
In this case defendant neglects to present this Court
with the following colloquy amongst counsel for both sides and
the trial court in the preparation of jury instructions:
The Court: Then we have proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. It's a two-paragraph one.
It's the one that goes, "It's not one that is
nearly [sic] fanciful or imaginary." It's
the more expanded one that we have used.
Mr. Souvall [Defense Counsel]: This is the
one that I objected to on the Ellifritz trial
because it has the word "substantial" in it.
2

Subsequent to its ruling in Medina, the Utah Supreme Court
held "that in most circumstances the term 'manifest injustice [as
it appears in rule 19(c)]' is synonymous with the 'plain error'
standard expressly provided in Utah Rule of Evidence 103(d) and
elaborated upon in fState v. Eldredae. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah 1989)1."
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989). Thus,
defendant's claim of plain error is properly addressed under the
manifest injustice standard of rule 19(c).

5

A reasonable doubt is cne that is real and
substantial. I think substantial is way too
strong of a word to describe a reasonable
doubt.
The Court: I don't. The more I have thought
about it the more I think that is probably
the best description we can give them. But I
understand your concern. What do you suggest
as an alternative?
Mr. Souvall: Delete the sentence. Just,
[HIJt is a doubt based upon reason and one
which reasonable men and women would have
upon a consideration of the evidence.["]
Just delete that before the semicolon.
The Court: You would have to say, ["A]
doubt, reasonable doubt, and is a doubt based
upon . . .,"
Mr. Souvall: Yes.
Mr. Williams [State Prosecutor]: I will not
go over the ["]substantial,[-] but I think I
would still want the ["]real[M] language,
["A] reasonable doubt is one which is real
and is based upon reason.["]
The Court: ["]Reasonable doubt is one which
is real and is based upon . . . [."] Okav,
Harrv?
Mr. Souvall: That's fine.
that.

I won't object to

The Court: [w] A reasonable doubt is one
which is real and based upon reason and one
which is — [."]
Mr. Souvall: What instruction number was
that?
The Court:

5.3

3

A brief examination of jury instruction 5, in conjunction
with the above colloquy, reveals that the trial court fully
accommodated defense counsel's request over its own considerations
about the best instruction to give to the jury (Jury Instruction
#5, R. 81, attached herein at Appendix A ) .

6

(Transcript of Trial at 199-200) (emphasis added).

There was no

further discussion concerning the sufficiency of the trial
court's reasonable doubt instruction.

Because defendant

positively acceded to the reasonable doubt instruction, which was
amended at his request, he, as the defendant in Medina. is in no
position to claim on appeal that the instruction was erroneously
given.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully
requests this Court to affirm defendant's.conviction.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7^

day of November, 1991.

R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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APPENDIX E

INSTRUCTION NUMBER
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
that satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. A
reasonable doubt is not one that is merely possible, fanciful,
or imaginary, because almost everything related to human
affairs is open to some possible doubt.

A reasonable doubt

is one which is real and is based upon reason and one which
reasonable men and women would have upon a consideration of
all the evidence.

It must arise from the evidence or lack of

evidence in the case.
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of
the evidence, you can honestly say that you are not satisfied
of the Defendant's guilt, you have a reasonable doubt; but if
after such impartial consideration and comparison of all the
evidence you can truthfully say that you have an abiding
conviction of Defendant's guilt such as you would be willing
to act upon in the more weighty and important matters relating
to your affairs, you have no reasonable doubt.
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